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Abstract
The Note argues that the U.S. Customs Service should revise the affiliate exception to resolve
the exception’s present inconsistency with section 42 of the Lanham Act. The Note argues that
the affiliate exception is incongruous with the plain language and underlying intent of section 42
of the Lanham Act. The Note finally argues that the Customs Service should revise the affiliate
exception to maintain consistency with the very statute it was promulgated to enforce.
SECf ION 42 OF THE LANHAM ACT AND
NON-GENUINE GRAY MARKET GOODS:
RE-EVALUATING THE AFFILIATE
EXCEPTION
INTRODUCTION
Section 42 of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946 (the
"Lanham Act" or the "Act"),' prohibits the importation of
goods bearing trademarks that "copy or simulate" trademarks
registered in the United States.2 The U.S. Customs Service's
regulations issued to implement section 42, however, contain
an "affiliate exception"' that permits the importation of for-
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988). Section 42 of this Act states that
no article of imported merchandise which shall copy or simulate the name of
the [sic] any domestic manufacture, or manufacturer, or trader, or of any
manufacturer or trader located in any foreign country which, by treaty, con-
vention, or law affords similar privileges to citizens of the United States, or
which shall copy or simulate a trade-mark registered in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter or shall bear a name or mark calculated to induce
the public to believe that the article is manufactured in the United States, or
that is manufactured in any foreign country or locality other than the coun-
try or locality in which it is in fact manufactured, shall be admitted entry at
any customhouse of the United States; and, in order to aid the officers of the
customs in enforcing this prohibition, any domestic manufacturer or trader,
and any foreign manufacturer or trader, who is entitled under the provisions
of a treaty, convention, declaration, or agreement between the United States
and any foreign country to the advantages afforded by law to citizens of the
United States in respect to trade-marks and commercial names, may require
his name and residence, and the name of the locality in which his goods are
manufactured, and a copy of the certificate of registration of his trademark,
issued in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, to be recorded in
books which shall be kept for this purpose in the Department of the Treas-
ury, under such regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe,
and may furnish to the Department facsimiles of his name, the name of the
locality in which his goods are manufactured, or of his registered trade-
mark, and thereupon the Secretary of the Treasury shall cause one or more
copies of the same to be transmitted to each collector or other proper officer
of customs.
15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1988).
2. Id.
3. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (c)(l)-(2) (1989). The affiliate exception is part of the Cus-
toms Service's regulations concerning trademarks, trade names, and copyrights,
which provide, in pertinent part:
(a) Copying or simulating marks or names. Articles of foreign or domestic manu-
facture bearing a mark or name copying or simulating a recorded trademark
or trade name shall be denied entry and are subject to forfeiture as prohib-
ited importations. A "copying or simulating" mark or name is an actual
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eign-made goods bearing trademarks registered in the United
States if the U.S. trademark owner and the foreign manufac-
turer are subject to common ownership or control.4 As a re-
sult, third parties may capitalize on the affiliation between a
foreign manufacturer and a U.S. trademark owner and import
foreign-made goods bearing U.S. trademarks into the United
States. 5 These goods, commonly called "gray market goods," 6
may differ physically from the products distributed by the U.S.
trademark owner. The importation of these "non-genuine" 7
gray market goods pursuant to the affiliate exception conflicts
with the plain meaning and underlying intent of section 42 of
counterfeit of the recorded mark or name or is one which so resembles it as
to be likely to cause the public to associate the copying or simulating mark
with the recorded mark or name.
(b) Idntical trademark. Foreign-made articles bearing a trademark identical
with one owned and recorded by a citizen of the United States or a corpora-
tion or association created or organized within the United States are subject
to seizure and forfeiture as prohibited importations.
(c) Restrictions not applicable. The restrictions set forth in paragraphs (a) and
(b) of this section do not apply to imported articles when:
(1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade name are owned by
the same person or business entity;
(2) The foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are parent
and subsidiary companies or otherwise subject to common ownership or
control ....
19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (a), (b), (c)(1)-(2) (1989).
4. Id. § 133.21(c)(1)-(2); see id. § 133.2(d). Section 133.2(d) defines common
ownership as "individual or aggregate ownership of more than 50 percent of the
business entity." Id. § 133.2(d)(1). Section 133.2(d) defines common control as "ef-
fective control in policy and operations ... not necessarily synonymous with common
ownership." Id. § 133.2(d)(2).
5. See, e.g., Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 156 (1989) (trademark owner sues third party importer of porcelain
figurines); NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 851 (1987) (trademark owner sues third party importer of computer chips);
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987) (trademark owner sues third party importer of "Cab-
bage Patch" dolls).
6. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 285 (1988) (defining gray market
goods as "foreign manufactured good[s], bearing a valid United States trademark,
that [are] imported without the consent of the U.S. trademark holder"); Sebastian
Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contact (PTY) Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 909, 910 (D.NJ. 1987),
vacated and remanded, 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988) ("Gray market goods are author-
ized authentic imports which are available in this country outside their normal chan-
nels of distribution."). For a detailed discussion of gray market goods, see infra notes
60-63 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text (defining non-genuine goods).
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the Lanham Act.8
This Note argues that the U.S. Customs Service should re-
vise the affiliate exception to resolve the exception's present
inconsistency with section 42 of the Lanham Act. Part I ana-
lyzes the Lanham Act, section 42 of the Act, and the common
law principles of trademarks applicable to the gray market.
Part II traces the development of the gray market and the affili-
ate exception. Part III argues that the affiliate exception is in-
congruous with the plain language and underlying intent of
section 42 of the Lanham Act. This Note concludes that the
Customs Service should revise the affiliate exception to main-
tain consistency with the very statute it was promulgated to en-
force.
I. TRADEMARK LA W, THE LANHAM ACT,
AND SECTION 42
A trademark is a name or symbol that signifies the source
of the good to which it is attached.9 Historically, manufactur-
ers have employed trademarks to enhance the marketability of
their products.'" A trademark creates a merchandising vehi-
cle" for its owner by distinguishing the trademark owner's
8. See infra notes 123-34 and accompanying text (delineating incongruity be-
tween § 42 and affiliate exception).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988). Section 45 of the Lanham Act defines a trademark
to include "any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof ... used
by a person . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique
product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the
goods, even if that source is unknown." Id.
10. R. DOLE, TERRITORIAL TRADEMARK RIGTrs AND THE ANTITRuST LAws I n.2
(1965); 1 H. NiMs, THE LAw OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 185, at
509 (4th ed. 1947).
11. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205
(1942). Justice Frankfurter stated that
[t]he protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychological
function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true
that we purchase goods by them. A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut
which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led
to believe he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by
making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the
drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed, the
aim is the same-to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential cus-
tomers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears. Once this
is attained, the trade-mark owner has something of value.
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goods from those of its competitors.' 2  Trademarks foster
competition and maintain product quality by securing to the
producer the benefit of a good reputation;' 3 thus, they are val-
uable tools of commerce.' 4
Trademarks alone have no inherent value.' 5 The value of
a trademark lies in the goodwill that the trademark owner en-
genders in the mark.' 6 The trademark owner builds goodwill
by offering a high-quality product, a fair price, and peripheral
services.' 7 These factors induce the consumer to associate the
trademark with the services provided by the manufacturer.' 8
As a result, the consumer buys products bearing a particular
trademark in order to receive the services provided by the
manufacturer.' 9 The trademark becomes a guarantee that
12. James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266 (7th Cir.
1976).
13. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985). The
Supreme Court noted that "[n]ational protection of trademarks is desirable ... be-
cause trademarks foster competition and the maintenance of quality by securing to
the producer the benefits of good reputation." Id.
14. Id. at 193.
15. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) ("There
is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to an
established business or trade in connection with which the mark is employed.");
Berni v. International Gourmet Restaurants of Am. Inc., 838 F.2d 642, 646 (2d Cir.
1988) ("A trademark is a mere symbol of the goodwill of the business with which it is
associated."); 1J. McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION i 2:1, at 44 (2d
ed. 1984 & 1989 Supp.); 1 H. NIMS, supra note 10, § 188, at 520 ("There is no such
thing as a trademark in gross.").
16. White Tower Sys. Inc. v. White Castle Sys. of Eating Houses Corp., 90 F.2d
67, 69 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 720 (1937) ("Good will may be defined as the
favorable consideration shown by the purchasing public to goods known to emanate
from a particular source.").
17. Levitt Corp. v. Levitt, 593 F.2d 463, 468 (2d Cir. 1979) (goodwill is derived
from reputation for quality and service); see S. KANE, TRADEMARK LAw: A PRACTi-
TIONER'S GUIDE 10 (1987) (value of goodwill increases with advertising and sales); I
H. NIMs, supra note 10, § 14, at 80 ("Skill, reliability, quality of product, reasonable-
ness of prices . . .may create good-will.").
18. Shoppers Fair of Ark., Inc. v. Sanders Co., 328 F.2d 496, 499 (8th Cir.
1964). When a consumer comes to associate a trademark with its source, the mark is
said to acquire secondary meaning, which entitles the mark to full protection. Ameri-
can Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 663 (2d Cir. 1979)
("[W]hen a company causes the public to associate a certain word with that com-
pany's business, that word has a secondary meaning and receives the full protection
of the law of trademark and unfair competition."); see 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15,
§ 15:2, at 659 ("The prime element of secondary meaning is a mental association in
buyers' minds between the alleged mark and a single source of the product.").
19. See, e.g., Bell & Howell : Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063,
1069 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), vacated and remanded, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983).
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goods sold under it meet particular standards of quality. 20
Consumer goodwill is a valuable intangible asset.2' Manu-
facturers that mark their goods with a trademark confusingly
similar to an existing trademark can easily damage or misap-
propriate the trademark owner's goodwill.22 Consequently,
courts and legislators have long afforded protection to trade-
mark owners by prohibiting this type of unfair competition.23
The primary instrument of modern day trademark protec-
tion is the Lanham Act. 24 Enacted to clarify and unify piece-
meal state and federal trademark legislation, 5 the Lanham Act
provides a trademark owner a means of protection against un-
fair competition. 6 The Lanham Act serves two broad goals.
20. Bell & Howell, 548 F. Supp. at 1069.
21. 1 H. NIMS, supra note 10, § 13, at 79 ("Good-will cannot be seen or felt,
measured or weighed. Yet ... it has value .... ).
22. See 1J. McCARTHY, supra note 15, § 2:1, at 44.
23. See Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 274, 19 Stat. 141; Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230,
§ 77, 16 Stat. 198; McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 251 (1877); Canal Co. v. Clark,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 322 (1871). The early trademark statutes were found to be
unconstitutional exercises of Congress's patent and copyright power. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (Trade-Mark Cases).
24. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988).
25. Hearings on H.R. 13486 Before the House Committee on Patents, 69th Cong., 2d
Sess. 86 (1927) ("There has been piece meal legislation on [trademarks] ... as far
back as 1881.... There has never been comprehensive legislation dealing with it.")
[hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 13486]; S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946),
reprinted in 1946 U.S. CONG. SERV. 1274, 1274 (1946) ("The purpose of this bill is to
place all matters relating to trade-marks in one statute. ) [hereinafter SENATE
REPORT].
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988); see SENATE REPORT, supra note 25 at 1274 (stating
that Lanham Act protects trademark owners from "misappropriation by pirates and
cheats").
27. SENATE REPORT, supra note 25. The Senate Committee on Patents that re-
ported on the Lanham Act stated that
[t]he purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold. One is to pro-
tect the public so it may be confident that.., it will get the product... it ...
wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy,
time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in
his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats.
Id. at 1274; see 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988). Section 45 of the Lanham Act states that
[t]he intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within the control of
Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks
in such commerce ... to prevent fraud and deception in such commerce by
the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of reg-
istered marks.
Id.; Warner Bros. Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 740, 760 (S.D.N.Y.
!988) ("The objective of trademark protection is to protect the maker of goods and
the public from confusion as to the origin of goods .... ). The U.S. Court of Ap-
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First, the Act strives to protect a trademark owner's goodwill
by granting the owner a means of registering a mark.28 A
trademark owner may prevent others from using confusingly
similar marks in commerce.2 9 Second, the Lanham Act at-
tempts to prevent consumer deception by prohibiting unau-
thorized imitation marks from entering commerce.3 ° Congress
intended this prohibition to allow consumers to rely confi-
dently on a trademark when choosing products.3 ' Section 42
of the Lanham Act embodies both of these broad goals in the
context of international trade. 2
Section 42 of the Lanham Act serves both goals of the
Lanham Act 33 by prohibiting the importation of goods bearing
trademarks that "copy or simulate" marks owned by U.S. cor-
porations. First, section 42 protects the U.S. trademark
owner's goodwill by barring imports with imitation marks.3 4
This assures the trademark owner that a foreign competitor
will not missappropriate or damage the U.S. trademark
owner's goodwill by importing products with imitation or con-
fusingly similar trademarks. 5 Second, section 42 protects the
peals for the Sixth Circuit stated that "trademark law.., pursues two related goals-
the prevention of deception and consumer confusion, and, more fundamentally, the
protection of property interests in trademarks." Ameritech, Inc. v. American Infor-
mation Technologies Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964 (6th Cir. 1987).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
29. Id. § 1114. This section reads, in pertinent part,
[a]ny person who shall, without consent of the registrant ... use in com-
merce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a regis-
tered mark in connection with the sale... of any goods or services... which
such use is likely to cause confusion .... shall be liable in a civil action by the
registrant ....
Id.
30. Id. § 1127.
31. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205
(1942) ("A trade-mark.., induces a purchaser to select what he wants .... ").
32. See 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1988). The legislative history of section 42 illustrates
an intent by Congress to enact comprehensive and consistent legislation dealing with
trademarks in international trade. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 13486, supra note 25, at
86 ("The United States has agreed, under international conventions to which it is a
party, to provide means for preventing entry and stopping at the customs of goods
bearing counterfeit trade-marks, marks infringing registered trade-marks, and goods
bearing false trade names or false indications of geographical origin.").
33. Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert.
before judgment denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987) ("[S]ection [42] appears to aim at deceit
and consumer confusion .... ).
34. See 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1988).
35. See id.
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consumer from deception by barring imports bearing confus-
ingly similar marks. 6 Consequently, U.S. consumers will not
be enticed to purchase bogus foreign-made goods when they
desire the product from the U.S. source.
Section 42 appears to bar the importation of two different
types of goods: those that bear an illegal, counterfeit trade-
mark (black market goods)3 7 and those that bear a genuine
trademark that is not authorized for use in the United States
(gray market goods)., 8 Both the legislative history of section
42 and judicial interpretations of the section, however, es-
pouse divergent views regarding the extent of the protection
provided by section 42.
The legislative history of section 42 indicates a congres-
sional concern with both black market and gray market
goods.3 9 In fact, original versions of the bill that subsequently
became the Lanham Act were drafted to exclude gray market
goods under section 42.40 Congress amended the bill, how-
ever, to exclude only goods that contained counterfeit or
spurious marks.4' It appears Congress made this amendment
36. See id.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1988). The black market is defined as the illegal "buying
and selling [of] goods which are subject to government... control." BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 155 (5th ed. 1979). Because the Lanham Act prohibits the sale of goods
bearing counterfeit marks, these goods can be characterized as black market goods.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1988). However, the definition of black market goods can also
include stolen goods bearing authentic trademarks. See Hansen, Gray Market Goods: A
Lighter Shade of Black, 13 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 249, 249 (1987).
38. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 285 (1988). See infra notes
90-104 and accompanying text for a description of genuine and non-genuine trade-
marked goods.
39. Hearings on H.R. 2828 Before the House Committee on Patents, 71st Cong., 2d
Sess. 19 (1930) ("[Tlhis committee ... felt it incumbent upon it to lift that provision
[which excludes gray market goods] out of the tariff bill in 1922 and put it in this
[trademark] bill where it belongs."); Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before the Subcommittee on
Trademarks of the House Committee on Patents, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1939) ("Any
merchandise, whatever may be its source or origin, which shall bear any registered
trade-mark or any infringement thereof ... shall not be imported into the United
States .... ").
40. Hearings on H.R. 9041 Before the Subcommittee on Trademarks of the House Commit-
tee on Patents, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 192 (1938) (statement of Represenatative Lan-
ham). The bill stated that "[a]ny merchandise, whatever may be its source or origin,
which shall bear any regstered trade-mark or any infringement thereof,... shall not
be imported into the United States or admitted to entry at any customhouse of the
United States." Id.
41. Compare H.R. 9041, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) (containing language bar-
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because section 526(a) of the Tariff Act of 193042 ostensibly
remedied the gray market problem.43 Although section 42
clearly evinces an intent to exclude black market goods, the
legislative history makes it unclear whether section 42 excludes
gray market goods.
Similarly, two judicial interpretations concerning section
27 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905,4 4 the predecessor of section
42, raise the question of whether section 42 prohibits gray
market imports. First, in Fred Gretsch Manufacturing Company v.
Schoening,45 the defendant was the exclusive U.S. agent for Ger-
man-made "Eternelle" violin strings.46 The defendant regis-
tered the trademark "Eternelle" in the United States, but the
manufacturer had the rights to the mark abroad. 47 The plain-
tiff purchased the "Eternelle" strings abroad and attempted to
bring them into the United States; however, the strings were
detained at customs. 48 The plaintiff sued to allow the importa-
tion of the strings.49 The court applied a literal reading of sec-
tion 27 and held that the statute applied only to black market
goods and did not apply to gray market goods.50 Several
ring genuine goods) with 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (containing no language barring genuine
goods).
42. Tariff Act of 1930, § 526(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1988). For the complete
text of § 526(a), see infra note 67.
43. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 293-94 (1988) (upholding
importation of genuine goods under § 526(a) when U.S. trademark owner and for-
eign manufacturer are affiliated).
44. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 27, 33 Stat. 724, 730. This statute reads, in
pertinent part: "[n]o article of imported merchandise which ... shall bear a name or
mark calculated to induce the public to believe that the article is manufactured in the
United States... shall be admitted to entry at any custom-house of the United States
.... I d.
45. 238 F. 780 (2d Cir. 1916).
46. Id. at 781. The defendant did not manufacture the strings. Id. at 780-81.
With the manufacturer's approval, however, the defendant registered the word
"Eternelle" as his trademark and filed a copy with the Department of Treasury, so as
to bar third-party importers of "Eternelle" strings. Id. at 781.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 780. The plaintiff sued for an injunction requiring defendant to with-
draw his notice of ownership filed with the Department of Treasury. Id. The injunc-
tion was granted in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Id.
50. Id. at 782. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit analyzed cases
decided before the passage of section 27 that held that U.S. trademark owners could
not bar the importation of genuine trademarked goods. Id. at 781-82 (citing Appol-
linaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18 (2d Cir. 1886) and Russia Cement Co. v. Frauenhar,
133 F. 518 (2d Cir. 1904)). The court held that "[t]he obvious purpose [of section
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courts have adopted this narrow view of section 42 and, thus,
have held that section 42 does not exclude the importation of
gray market goods. 5'
Conversely, in A. Bourjois & Company v. Katzel,52 the U.S.
Supreme Court adopted an expansive interpretation of trade-
mark law.53 In Katzel, the plaintiff purchased the exclusive U.S.
trademark rights to French-made "Java" face powder.54 The
defendant purchased the trademarked powder from the
French manufacturer and imported it into the United States
over the objection of the plaintiff.55  In reversing the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the U.S. Supreme
27] is to protect the public and prevent any one from importing goods identified by
their registered trade-mark which are not genuine." Id. at 782 (emphasis added).
Thus, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the principle of universality
of trademarks. See Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
This theory states that once a trademarked product enters commerce, the trademark
owner's rights are exhausted, and the owner cannot bring a suit stemming from the
use or misuse of that trademarked product. See id. The Osawa court stated that
if a trademark was lawfully affixed to merchandise in one country, the mer-
chandise would carry that mark lawfully wherever it went and could not be
deemed an infringer although transported to another country where the ex-
clusive right to the mark was held by someone other than the owner of the
merchandise.
Id. at 1171.
This theory of universality is inextricably connected to the theory of trademark
"exhaustion." Id. at 1173-74. Under this theory the trademark owner can only con-
trol the first sale of goods bearing his trademark. Id. Once the goods enter the
stream of commerce, the trademark owner's rights are "exhausted," and can no
longer be asserted. Id.
51. See Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 156 (1989) (rejecting notion that trademark law reaches genuine goods);
NEC Electronics v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
851 (1987) ("Trademark law generally does not reach the sale of genuine goods
bearing a true mark even though such sale is without the mark owner's consent."); see
aho Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo Int'l (Am.) Corp., 707 F.2d 1054, 1057-58
(9th Cir. 1983) (dismissing plaintiff's trademark cause of action for unauthorized sale
of a genuine good).
52. 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
53. Id. at 691. The Court barred the importation of genuine goods bearing an
authentic trademark because the trademark "deals with a delicate matter that may be
of great value but that easily is destroyed." Id. at 692.
54. Id. at 690. The plaintiff did not manufacture the powder, but imported the
French-made powder upon which the French manufacturer affixed the "Java" trade-
mark. Id. The plaintiff invested money in advertising to increase the U.S. sales of the
powder. Id. at 691.
55. Id. at 691. The defendant found that the exchange rate enabled her to profit
by purchasing the powder in France and selling it in the United States under the
French trademark. Id.
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Court interpreted section 27 broadly. 6 The Court held that
the authentically trademarked gray goods could be excluded
because in the United States the "Java" mark represented the
"delicate" and "easily destroyed" goodwill of the trademark
owner, which should be protected from misappropriation.57
Furthermore, the Court stated that mere possession of trade-
marked goods does not entitle the possessor to sell the goods
under that mark.58 At least one court and several commenta-
tors have adopted this broad reading of section 42."
56. Id. at 691-92. Although the Court did not explicitly mention section 27, the
lower court decision in Katzel relied on that section. See A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel,
275 F. 539, 543 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923). The Supreme Court later
linked the Katzel holding to section 27 in a case involving the same plaintiff. See A.
Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge, 263 U.S. 675 (1923).
57. Katzel, 260 U.S. at 692. Justice Holmes stated that
[it is said that the Uava] trade-mark.., is that of the French house and truly
indicates the origin of the goods. But that is not accurate. It is the trade-
mark of the plaintiff only in the United States and indicates in law, and, it is
found, by public understanding, that the goods come from the plaintiff
although not made by it.... It stakes the reputation of the plaintiff upon
the character of the goods.
Id.
58. Id. ("Ownership of the goods does not carry the right to sell them with a
specific mark."). Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the principle of territoriality
of trademarks. This theory states that a trademark represents the independently de-
veloped goodwill of the domestic trademark and that goods that are genuinely trade-
marked abroad can infringe a U.S. trademark. E.g., Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589
F. Supp. 1163, 1171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
One trademark authority states that "[t]oday it is no longer seriously questioned
that the trademark and the good will symbolized by it may have a separate legal exist-
ence in different parts of the world, and therefore, be subject to territorial assign-
ment and-it must follow-have a 'situs' in more than one country." Derenberg,
Territorial Scope and Situs of Trademarks and Good Will, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 387, 388
(1978).
The principle of territoriality is also recognized in the international arena by
article 6(3) of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, to
which the United States is a signatory. Paris Convention for the Protection of Indus-
trial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, art. 6, 3, revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6293, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. Article 6(3) of the Paris Coven-
tion provides that "[a] mark duly registered in a [signatory] country ... shall be
regarded as independent of marks registered in the other [signatory] countries ....
including the country of origin." Id.
The concept of territoriality of trademark rights also applies to trademark own-
ers who use their marks only in the United States. When two trademark owners si-
multaneously use the same mark in different geographical areas, they are limited to
the respective localities where their marks are used, plus a "zone of natural expan-
sion." 2J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 26:8, at 301; see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1988).
59. See Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1171-75. But see NEC Electronics v. CAL Circuit
Abco, 810 F.2d 1506, 1509-10 (9th Cir.) (rejecting notion that section 42 covers gen-
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Section 42 certainly applies to black market goods, but the
courts have struggled with the issue of whether section 42 can
apply to goods bearing an authentic trademark. Because gray
market goods by definition bear authentic marks, the section's
applicability to the gray market remains uncertain.
II. THE GRAY MARKET CONTROVERSY
A. Creation of the Gray Market
The gray market arises when foreign-made goods that
bear genuine trademarks enter the United States outside of au-
thorized distribution channels. 60  Gray market imports typi-
cally enter the United States through third party importers
who purchase the goods abroad after the goods have left the
control of the manufacturer. 6' Gray market goods by defini-
tion bear authentic trademarks.62 These trademarks, however,
are not authorized for use in the United States.63
The genesis of the current gray market lies in section 42 of
the Lanham Act and in section 526(a) of the Tariff Act.6 In
1921, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
uine goods), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 851 (1987). See generally Derenberg, supra note 58,
at 389 (discussing ramifications of territoriality theory on international trademark
law).
60. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 285-87 (1988). A good working
definition of the gray market is found in Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 618 F.
Supp. 700, 702 (D.NJ. 1985), rev'd, 878 F.2d 659 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 156
(1989) ("Grey market goods are goods produced by a foreign manufacturer bearing
the manufacturer's trademark which are legally purchased abroad under a particular
trademark and are sold in competition with goods of the United States trademark
owner of the same mark."); see Hansen, supra note 37, at 249 ("Gray goods are brand-
name products manufactured abroad which bear an authentic trademark authorized
by the owner of the trademark in the market for which the goods are intended.").
When the U.S. trademark owner imports the product, the goods are also known as
"parallel importations." Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1555 (Fed.
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
The principal motivation behind the gray market is arbitrage. See, e.g., W. Goe-
bel Porzellanfabrik v. Action Indus., Inc., 589 F. Supp. 763, 764 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
("A gray market is created when an arbitrageur takes advantage of a price difference
between two markets by buying in the market where prices are lower and selling in
the market where prices are higher.").
61. See Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert.
beforejudgment denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987); Hansen, supra note 37, at 249.
62. K Mart, 486 U.S. at 285.
63. See, e.g., Lever Bros., 877 F.2d at 102 (U.K.-made trademarked goods im-
ported over objection of U.S. trademark owner).
64. Tariff Act of 1930, § 526(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1988).
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that section 27 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905,65 the predeces-
sor of section 42 of the Lanham Act, did not bar the importa-
tion of gray market goods.66 In response to this holding, Con-
gress enacted section 526(a) of the Tariff Act.67 This section
made it illegal to import goods bearing a trademark registered
in the United States68 and appeared to eliminate the gray mar-
ket.69 The Customs Service regulations designed to imple-
ment section 526(a) and-section 42, however, contain the affili-
ate exception, which has led to the creation of the gray mar-
ket.70
The supporters of the gray market argue that the exist-
ence of the gray market is in the best interest of the consumer
because it prevents international antitrust problems while pro-
viding U.S. consumers with lower prices.7' These proponents
65. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 27, 33 Stat. 724, 730.
66. A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539, 543 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S.
689 (1923). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 52-59 and accompanying
text.
67. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a). The section reads, in pertinent part:
(a) Importation prohibited
[I]t shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of
foreign manufacture if such merchandise, or the label, sign, print, package,
wrapper, or receptacle, bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a
corporation or association created or organized within, the United States
Id.
The Tariff Act amendment was enacted quickly to bar the importation of trade-
marked goods allowed by the Second Circuit's Katzel decision:
A recent decision of the circuit court of appeals holds that existing law does
not prevent the importation of merchandise bearing the same trade-mark as
merchandise of the United States, if the imported merchandise is genuine
and if there is no fraud upon the public. The Senate Amendment makes
such importation unlawful without the consent of the owner of the American
trade-mark ....
H.R. REP. No. 1223, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1922).
68. Tariff Act of 1930, § 526(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1988). For the complete
text of section 526(a), see supra note 67.
69. H.R. REP. No. 1223, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1922). The report stated
that "[t]he senate amendment makes . . . [the importation of genuine trademarked
goods] ... unlawful without the consent of the owner of the American trademark, in
order to protect the American manufacturer or producer ..... Id.
70. See 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(a), (b), (c)(1)-(3) (1989). For the complete text of the
pertinent U.S. Customs Service regulations, see supra note 3.
71. Parfums Stem, Inc. v. United States Customs Serv., 575 F. Supp. 416, 421
(S.D. Fla. 1983) (public benefits from lower prices on less expensive gray goods); see
Hansen, supra note 37, at 251 (discussing benefits of gray market). For an analysis of
the relevant international antitrust issues, see infra 135-44 and accompanying text.
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contend that barring gray market goods would permit foreign
corporations to engage in illegal international price discrimi-
nation.12 In addition, gray market proponents assert that the
gray market fosters intrabrand competition, which results in
lower prices 7" because the U.S. trademark owner must reduce
prices to compete with the lower-priced gray market goods. 4
These two concerns were the impetus behind the promulga-
tion of the affiliate exception.75
B. The Affiliate Exception
The history of the affiliate exception illustrates the Cus-
toms Service's struggle to interpret properly section 526(a)
and section 27. In 1923, the U.S. Department of the Treasury
(the "Treasury Department") promulgated regulations that
enforced the plain language of section 526(a) and section 27
by barring all gray goods.76 In 1936, the Treasury Department
modified these regulations by enacting a "same company" ex-
ception to the general ban on gray market goods.77 Under the
same company exception, a holder of a U.S. trademark could
not enjoin the importation of gray market goods if that trade-
mark holder also owned the trademark overseas. 7 This excep-
tion prevented a foreign manufacturer from creating a world-
72. NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506, 1511 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 851 (1987) (Barring gray goods would create "a vehicle for establishing a
worldwide discriminatory pricing scheme."); see Proceedings of the Second Annualjudicial
Conference of the US. Court of International Trade, 111 F.R.D. 503, 542-45 (1985) (state-
ment of Mr. Collier) [hereinafter CI.T. Conference]. Mr. Collier noted that if U.S.
trademark holders "were to succeed in cutting off parallel imports, the likelihood is
that you would see even more.., monopolistic price discrimination." Id. at 544.
73. Parfums Stern, 575 F. Supp. at 421.
74. See id.
75. Vivitar v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1055 (1986); see Atwood, Import Restrictions on Trademarked Merchandise--The
Role of the United States Bureau of Customs, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 301, 307 (1969).
76. Cust. Reg. 1923, art. 476 (1923); Cust. Reg. 1931, arts. 517(a), 518 (1931).
77. T.D. 48,537, 70 Treas. Dec. 336, 337 (1936). The amended regulation
reads, in pertinent part:
[m]erchandise manufactured or sold in a foreign country under a trade-
mark ... shall not be deemed for the purpose of these regulations to copy or
simulate such United States trade-mark or trade name if such foreign trade-
mark or trade name and such United States trade-mark or trade name are
owned by the same person, partnership, association or corporation.
Id. (emphasis added).
78. Id.
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wide discriminatory pricing scheme simply by setting up a U.S.
subsidiary with nominal title to the trademark.79 The same
company exception furthered the Treasury Department's anti-
trust policies while remaining a reasonable interpretation of
sections 27 and 526(a).8 0
In 1953, the Customs Service broadened the same com-
pany exception to include situations where the foreign trade-
mark owner was a "related company" of the U.S. owner.8 ' In
1959, however, the Customs Service returned to the 1936
same company exception. 2 This regulation remained in place
until 1972.83 In 1972, the Customs Service kept the same
company exception intact while explicitly adding exceptions
for corporations that share a parent-subsidiary relationship or
otherwise share common control.8 4 The 1972 regulations con-
tinue to govern trademarked imports."5
Current Customs regulation 133.21 is part of the 1972
promulgation. Regulations 133.21(a) and (b) contain pro-
scriptions against the importation of goods that bear trade-
marks that "copy or simulate" registered marks or that bear
genuine trademarks registered in the United States by another
corporation.8 6 Sections 133,21(c)(1) and (2) contain excep-
tions to sections 133.21(a) and (b) for cases in which the manu-
facturer and the U.S. trademark holder are subject to common
ownership or control.8 7 Sections 133.21(c)(1) and (2) permit
the creation of the gray market by allowing the importation of
goods bearing trademarks owned by an affiliated manufacturer
abroad, but not authorized for sale in the United States.88 De-
spite many court challenges, this 1972 amendment remains in-
79. See Vivitar v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1985) cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1055 (1986); Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. ABC Int'l Traders Corp., 703 F.
Supp. 1398, 1404 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
80. See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1566-67.
81. T.D. 53,399, 88 Treas. Dec. 376, 384 (1953); see Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1566.
82. T.D. 54,932, 94 Treas. Dec. 433 (1959).
83. See Atwood, supra note 75, at 307.
84. T.D. 72-266, 6 Cust. B. & Dec. 539 (1972) (codified at 19 C.F.R.
§ 133.21(c)(1)-(2)(1989)). For the text of the affiliate exception, see supra note 3.
85. See 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(a)-(c) (1989).
86. Id. § 133.21 (a)-(b).
87. Id. § 133.21 (c)(1)-(2).
88. See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
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tact as today's affiliate exception.8 9
The affiliate exception has spawned two types of gray mar-
ket goods: genuine and non-genuine gray market goods.90
Although both genuine and non-genuine gray market goods
are produced overseas and bear authentic trademarks, genuine
gray market goods are physically identical to and carry the
same peripheral services as the U.S. goods with which they
compete.9 ' Genuine gray market goods pass unhindered
through U.S. customs pursuant to the affiliate exception be-
89..19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(2) (1989). In 1988, the Supreme Court held that
the affiliate exception was a valid interpretation of section 526(a) of the Tariff Act. K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988). The Court did not reach, however,
the question of whether the exception was a valid interpretation of section 42 of the
Lanham Act. Id. at 290 n.3. In 1989, the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia provisionally held that the affiliate exception was an invalid interpretation of sec-
tion 42. Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert.
before judgment denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987).
90. Compare Lever Bros., 877 F.2d at 101 (barring importation of non-genuine
goods) with Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659 (3d Cir.) (allowing
importation of genuine goods), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 156 (1989).
In K Mart, the Supreme Court defined three separate gray market scenarios. K
Mart, 486 U.S. at 285-87. The first context ("case 1") involves a U.S. corporation
that purchases the U.S. trademark rights from an independent foreign manufacturer.
Id. at 286. The gray market occurs when a third party purchases the foreign-made
goods and imports them to the United States. Id.
The second context ("case 2") occurs when a foreign manufacturer seeks to con-
trol U.S. distribution of its goods and authorizes a U.S. affiliate to register the trade-
mark for the foreign-made goods. Id. Variations within this context are possible.
Two occur when the U.S. firm establishes a foreign manufacturing subsidiary ("case
2a") or unincorporated manufacturing division ("case 2b") to produce goods abroad
for eventual importation into the United States. Id. at 286-87.
The third context ("case 3") occurs when a U.S. corporation authorizes a foreign
manufacturer to utilize the U.S. trademark for goods sold exclusively in a foreign
market. Id. at 287. The gray market arises when the foreign-made goods are
purchased overseas and imported into the United States. Id.
A third variation on the case 2 scenario ("case 2c") would involve two manufac-
turing subsidiaries of a larger foreign corporation. The foreign-based subsidiary
would have the foreign trademark rights to a particular trademark granted from the
parent corporation. The U.S.-based manufacturing subsidiary would have the U.S.
rights to the identical mark. Thus, a gray market could be created when a third party
purchases the foreign-made goods and sells them in competition with the U.S.-made
goods. The goods would be materially different since each manufacturing subsidiary
would manufacture the goods to coincide with local specifications. Lever Bros., 877
F.2d at 103. This case 2c scenario was the subject of Lever Bros., Id. at 101.
91. See, e.g., Weil Ceramics and Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 156 (1989); NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 851 (1987); see also Kane, The Gray Market and Trademark
Infringement: Are Genuine Goods Created Equal?, 70J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 677,
682 (1988).
GRAY MARKET GOODS
cause the U.S. trademark owner and the foreign manufacturer
share a common corporate bond.92
The second type of gray market goods are non-genuine
goods.93 Non-genuine gray market goods differ physically
from their U.S. counterparts and often carry fewer peripheral
services than those counterparts. 94 The goods may differ ma-
terially because the foreign and domestic trademark owners
manufacture the goods under different standards of produc-
tion.95 In addition, non-genuine gray market goods may lack
instructions in the English language or a warranty supported
by the U.S. trademark holder.96 Non-genuine goods enter the
U.S. gray market when a third party imports foreign-made
goods that compete with the U.S. trademark owner's domesti-
cally manufactured goods. 97 The foreign manufacturer may le-
gally place a trademark on the goods but does not have the
right to export products with that mark to the United States.9 8
The affiliate exception, however, allows the importation of
goods produced by an affiliated foreign manufacturer. 99 Thus,
a third party may purchase the foreign-made goods and import
them into the United States.' 0 0
92. See 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(2) (1989).
93. See, e.g., Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(importation of non-genuine soap), cert. beforejudgment denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987);
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.)
(importation of non-genuine "Cabbage Patch" dolls), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847
(1987); El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1986)
(importation of non-genuine shoes), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817 (1987); Dial Corp. v.
Encina Corp., 643 F. Supp. 951 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (importation of non-genuine soap);
Dial Corp. v. Manghnani Inv. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Conn. 1987) (importation
of non-genuine soap).
94. See Lever Bros., 877 F.2d at 103-04.
95. See id. at 102. The plaintiff, Lever Brothers Company, was a domestic manu-
facturer. Id. The defendant, Lever Brothers Ltd., was a foreign manufacturer. Id.
Both were wholly-owned subsidiaries of a common corporate "grandparent." Id. at
102 n. 1. Thus, a third party could purchase the foreign-made goods and sell them in
the United States over the objection of the U.S. trademark owner. Id. at 102.
96. See, e.g., Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1168-69 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (discussing warranty and instruction problems in sale of gray market cameras).
97. See Lever Bros., 877 F.2d at 103.
98. See Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68, 70
(2d Cir.) (foreign manufacturer could employ trademark, but agreed not to import
legally trademarked goods into United States), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987).
99. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (c)(2) (1989). For the full text of the affiliate exception,
see supra note 3.
100. See, e.g., Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
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Non-genuine gray market goods may enter the United
States under the affiliate exception when the foreign manufac-
turer and the U.S. trademark owner are subject to common
control. 0 1 Because the controlling entity may have multiple
manufacturing facilities for its products, more than one manu-
facturer may possess the rights to use a single trademark
within its territory.10 2  Furthermore, each manufacturer is
likely to adjust its product to suit local preferences or laws.' 03
As a result, more than one manufacturer worldwide may affix
indistinguishable trademarks upon materially different
goods.' °4
Trademark holders within the United States injured by the
gray market may sue the importers of gray market goods'0 5 or
the Customs Service 0 6 to enjoin the importation of gray mar-
ket goods into the United States. Historically, such trademark
holders have challenged the regulations that admit gray market
imports under section 526(a) of the Tariff Act. 10 7 A recent
U.S. Supreme Court decision,'0 8 however, effectively closed
the Tariff Act avenue by holding that the Customs Service's
regulations were not inconsistent with the Tariff Act.' 0 9 How-
(third party imported goods without authorization by U.S. trademark owner or for-
eign trademark owner), cert. before judgment denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987).
101. See, e.g., id. at 102 (U.S. trademark owner and foreign manufacturer subsidi-
aries of larger corporation).
102. See Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1173 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(providing example of foreign and domestic manufacturers having rights to identical
trademark).
103. See Lever Bros., 877 F.2d at 103 (non-genuine soap due to "differing con-
sumer preferences, climatic conditions and regulatory standards"); Original Appa-
lachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68, 70 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 847 (1987) ("Cabbage Patch" dolls non-genuine due to Spanish language
"adoption papers"); Dial Corp. v. Manghnani Inv. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1230, 1234-35
(D. Conn. 1987) (non-genuine soap due, in part, to different fragrance, size, labels,
and lack of FDA approval); Dial Corp. v. Encina Corp., 643 F. Supp. 951, 952 (S.D.
Fla. 1986) (non-genuine soap due to different "chemical composition").
104. See Lever Bros., 877 F.2d at 102-03.
105. See, e.g., Weil Ceramics and Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 156 (1989).
106. See, e.g., Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
cert. beforejudgment denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987).
107. See Tariff Act of 1930, § 526(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1988).
108. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
109. Id. at 291. The Court in K Mart upheld the customs regulations allowing
the importation of goods produced by a foreign affiliate as valid interpretations of the
Tariff Act. Id. at 294. In contrast, the Court held that the customs regulations al-
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ever, the U.S. trademark holder can still employ the Lanham
Act" t0 to challenge the regulations that create the gray mar-
ket.'''
Recently, a U.S. trademark owner employed section 42 of
the Lanham Act to enjoin the importation of gray market
goods." 2 In Lever Brothers Company v. United States,"' the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that an affil-
iated foreign manufacturer's non-genuine goods could not be
imported under the affiliate exception because that regulation
violated section 42 of the Lanham Act.' "4 The plaintiff in Lever
Brothers manufactured soap bearing the trademarks "Shield"
and "Sunlight.""' 5 The defendant, a foreign affiliate of the
plaintiff, used identical marks for soap it produced for con-
sumption in the United Kingdom." 6 The foreign affiliate's
lowing the importation of goods made under the "authorized use" exception were
inconsistent interpretations of the Tariff Act. Id. at 294-95.
A U.S. trademark owner may still have a private right of action against the gray
market importer pursuant to section 526(c) of the Tariff Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1526(c)
(1988).
110. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988). U.S. trademark holders injured by the
gray market have employed several trademark causes of action seeking relief from
gray market importers. See Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 662-
63 (3d Cir.) (employing §§ 32, 33, and 42 of Lanham Act) cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 156
(1989); Lever Bros., 877 F.2d at 103-04 (employing § 42 of Lanham Act); El Greco
Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World Inc., 806 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 817 (1987) (employing §§ 32, 43, & 44 of Lanham Act).
11. See, e.g., Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir 1989)
(plaintiff challenged customs regulations under section 42), cert. beforejudgment denied,
481 U.S. 1069 (1987). Gray market goods have also been challenged under copy-
right law, contract law, and the Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organization Act
("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)-(d) (1988). See Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Con-
tact (PTY) Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 909 (D.N.J. 1987), vacated, 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988)
(employing copyright law); Johnson &Johnson Prods., Inc. v. DAL Int'l Trading Co.,
798 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1986) (employing contract law); Shaw v. Rolex Watch USA,
Inc., 673 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (employing RICO law).
112. Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. before
judgment denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 111. The holding in Lever Bros. was "provisional," and was remanded
to the district court for briefing on the legislative history of section 42. Id. However,
the court stated that "[the] virtually inevitable reading of § 42... bars foreign goods
bearing a trademark identical to a valid US trademark but physically different, re-
gardless of the trademark's genuine character abroad." Id.
115. Id. at 102.
116. Id. The U.S. trademark owner and the foreign manufacturer had a corpo-
rate "grandparent" in common, and, thus, the foreign-made goods came under the
purview of the affiliate exception. Id.
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products differed in composition from the plaintiff's products
to account for local preferences.'1 7 The plaintiff brought suit
under section 42 to enjoin the Customs Service from allowing
the importation into the United States of "Shield" and "Sun-
light" soaps produced in the United Kingdom." 8
The court found the affiliate exception an invalid interpre-
tation of section 42, reasoning that the mark on the non-genu-
ine gray market goods would cause the type of confusion Con-
gress sought to prevent by enacting section 42." 9 Thus, the
importation of authentically-marked foreign-made soap, which
could confuse consumers and damage the trademark owner's
goodwill, contravened the intent behind section 42.
III. IMPORTATION OF NON-GENUINE GRAY MARKET
GOODS CONTRAVENES SECTION 42 OF THE
LANHAM ACT
Several courts maintain that section 42 of the Lanham Act
does not apply to gray market goods because the express lan-
guage of the statute seeks to bar only those goods with trade-
marks that "copy or simulate" registered U.S. trademarks. 2 0
These arguments are misguided; section 42 should apply to
the gray market for two reasons. First, the principle of trade-
mark territoriality, which grants the trademark owner exclusive
rights to that mark within the owner's territory, dictates that
117. Id. at 103. To account for the British preference for baths, which permit
time for lather to develop, the foreign-made soap produced less lather than its U.S.-
made counterpart. Id.
118. Id. at 102.
119. Id. at 111. The court based its holding upon an analysis of three early
Supreme Court cases dealing with gray market goods. Id. at 106-08 (citing
Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924); A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge, 263
U.S. 675 (1923); A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923)). The Lever Bros.
court reasoned that these cases "view trademarks as having a specific territorial
scope, and are . . . consistent with the view that § 27 of the 1905 Act protects a
domestic trademark holder from goods genuinely trademarked abroad but imported
here by parties hoping to exploit consumer confusion between the domestic and for-
eign products." Lever Bros., 877 F.2d at 108.
The court found the basic purpose of the affiliate exception valid. Id. at 109.
The court stated, however, that mere affiliation through a "corporate grandparent"
cannot be an implied consent to allow importation of goods. Id. at 102, 109-10.
120. See, e.g., NEC Elecs. v. Cal Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506, 1509 (9th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 851 (1988) (".Trademark law generally does not reach the
sale of genuine goods bearing a true mark even though such sale is without the mark
owner's consent.").
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even genuine gray market imports can infringe the rights of
the U.S. trademark holder.' 2 ' Second, non-genuine gray mar-
ket imports cause the consumer confusion and loss of the
trademark owner's goodwill that section 42 was designed to
prevent. 22 Consequently, section 42 should be construed to
apply to goods bearing authentic marks, as it does to goods
bearing counterfeit marks.
A. The Affiliate Exception Fails to Enforce the Plain Language and
Underlying Intent of Section 42
Congress enacted section 42 to prevent the importation of
foreign goods bearing marks that "copy or simulate" trade-
marks registered in the United States and foreign goods that
denote a false designation of origin.12 ' The affiliate exception
in the Customs Service's regulations violates the plain meaning
of section 42 by permitting the importation of non-genuine
gray market goods.' 24
Non-genuine goods differ physically, yet bear trademarks
that are indistinguishable from their genuine U.S. counter-
parts. 2 5 Consumers who purchase non-genuine goods cannot
rely on the trademark to receive the quality and peripheral
services they have come to associate with the mark. Thus,
although the mark is legally affixed to the non-genuine goods,
from the consumers' perspective the mark is not truly authen-
tic. Only the trademark affixed to goods produced by the U.S.
manufacturer is authentic because only the U.S. mark can de-
liver to consumers the quality and peripheral services they as-
sociate with the mark. The trademark on the foreign-made
good is analogous to a "copy," albeit a legally affixed "copy,"
of the authentic U.S. trademark. This "copy" violates the plain
121. See A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923); Osawa & Co. v. B & H
Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
122. Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert.
beforejudgment denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987).
123. See 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1988).
124. Lever Bros., 877 F.2d at 111 ("[T]he natural, virtually inevitable, reading of
§ 42 is that it bars foreign goods bearing a trademark identical to a valid U.S. mark
but physically different, regardless of the trademarks' genuine character abroad or
affiliation between the producing firms.").
125. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text (defining non-genuine gray
market goods).
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language of section 42.126
Similarly, when non-genuine imports enter the United
States through the affiliate exception, they bear a mark that will
induce the public to believe that the product was made for a
particular trademark owner who exercises quality control over
the manufacturer. 2 7 A trademark indicates a single source of
origin to consumers, although the source may be anony-
mous.1 28 When making purchases, consumers rely on the
trademark to ensure that the goods emanate from this
source.' 2 9 Thus, even though the mark on the non-genuine
import is legally affixed, the consumer cannot rely on the mark
to deliver goods from the source the consumer has come to
expect. 30 The trademarks on non-genuine gray market im-
ports falsely indicate to the consumer that the trademarked
products come from the manufacturer the consumer has come
to trust. Thus, the consumer is deceived by this false designa-
tion of origin.
The affiliate exception also contravenes the congressional
intent behind section 42. By allowing the importation of non-
genuine gray market goods, the affiliate exception presents an
opportunity for consumer deceit and for the misappropriation
of the U.S. trademark owner's goodwill.' 3 ' Because non-genu-
ine gray market goods may differ from their genuine U.S.
counterparts, consumers may be deceived into purchasing a
trademarked product that does not carry the goodwill to which
the consumer has become accustomed. 32 As a result of this
deception, non-genuine gray market goods could impair the
126. See 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1988).
127. Id. The foreign manufacturer does not intend for U.S. consumers to misin-
terpret the mark, but the third party importer capitalizes on just this confusion. See K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 328 (1988) ("It is not the affiliates who are
doing the damage but third parties.").
128. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 3.3B, at 110 ("A trademark indicates a
single, albeit anonymous, source.").
129. See Falcon Rice Mill, Inc. v. Community Rice Mill, Inc., 725 F.2d 336, 348
(5th Cir. 1984) ("By ensuring correct information in the marketplace, the [trade-
mark] laws reduce losses caused by misunderstanding and deceit and thus permit
consumers and merchants to maximize their own welfare confident that the informa-
tion is truthful.").
130. See Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
cert. before judgment denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987).
131. Id.
132. Id.
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U.S. trademark holder's goodwill if the product or the services
behind the product do not live up to consumer expecta-
tions.' 33 The consumer will associate the trademark with an
inferior product and discontinue purchasing goods bearing
that mark. 134
B. The Affiliate Exception is Erroneously Based
on Antitrust Principles
Proponents of the gray market contend that the affiliate
exception aids the U.S. consumer by avoiding international an-
titrust problems while stimulating intrabrand competition.' 3 5
These arguments are unfounded. If gray market imports are
permitted to enter the United States, intrabrand competition
may result in lower prices in the short term.' 36 Eventually,
however, the trademark owner may invest less in its mark be-
cause the investment will not be recovered. 37 Consequently,
133. SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 1274. This report states that one of the
purposes of trademark law is to protect the goodwill of the trademark owner. Id. For
the pertinent text of this report, see supra note 27.
134. See Hansen, supra note 37, at 263.
135. See, e.g., Gorelick & Guttman, Parallel Importation After K Mart v. Cartier
("COPIAT"), 70J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 696, 704 (1988); Dam, Trademarks,
Price Discrimination and the Bureau of Customs, 7J.L. & ECON. 45, 57 (1964).
These arguments are simply an extension of the debate over the propriety of
vertical distribution restraints. Hansen, supra note 37, at 257. The argument that the
gray market fosters lower prices rests upon the "free-rider" antitrust principle. See
infta notes 136-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the free-rider principle.
The argument that the elimination of the gray market would result in unfair pricing
emerges from the "price discrimination" principle in antitrust law. See infra notes
140-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of the price discrimination principle.
For an analysis of vertical restraints in the gray market context, see Miller, Restricting
the Gray Market in Trademarked Goods: Per Se Legality, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 363 (1986).
136. See, e.g., Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States Customs Serv., 575 F. Supp.
416 (S.D. Fla. 1983). In Parfums Stern, the court stated that
there is adequate evidence that the public has the benefit of lower prices in
that those products offered by the John Doe Defendants are usually less ex-
pensive than those sold by Plaintiff through its authorized distributors.
Therefore, it appears that the Court would be doing the public a disservice
by preventing the dissemination of what appears to the Court, uncontro-
verted, to be equally good, yet less expensive, legitimate Oscar de la Renta
fragrance products.
Id. at 421.
137. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977). In
upholding the legality of vertical restraints, the court stated that sellers might not
provide goodwill-enhancing services in a "purely competitive" situation because of
the "free-rider" principle. Id. A "free-ride" occurs when one seller takes advantage
of the goodwill developed by another. See United States v. General Motors Corp.,
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fewer new products may enter the marketplace. 3 8 If gray mar-
ket imports are restricted, however, the domestic trademark
owner will be encouraged to invest in its mark because the
owner will eventually recover the investment in advertising and
services that create goodwill in its mark. This benefit will in-
crease interbrand competition as more manufacturers produce
trademarked goods without fear of losing their advertising in-
vestment. Interbrand competition will eventually result in
lower prices for the consumer, as competitors attempt to offer
the best product at the lowest price. Thus, the intrabrand
competition created by the gray market should be eliminated
so as to promote beneficial interbrand competition."3 9
Gray market proponents also argue that eliminating the
intrabrand competition fostered by the gray market would vio-
late established antitrust principles by allowing international
enterprises to engage in price discrimination.' 40  In order to
384 U.S. 127 (1965). In General Motors, authorized dealers offered test-drives and
showroom models to induce customers to purchase its automobiles. These dealers
raised their prices to compensate for these services. Discount dealers (unauthorized
dealers) offered the same automobiles at lower prices; however, these discount deal-
ers did not provide the services that the authorized dealers provided. Consequently,
consumers utilized the authorized dealers' services to decide which car to purchase
and then purchased that car from a discount dealer. Id. at 132-33. Thus, the dis-
count dealers took a "free ride" on the services of the authorized dealers. See Posner,
Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal
Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 285 (1975). Simi-
larly, a irademark owner who provides services to enhance its goodwill must engage
in some distribution restrictions (i.e., eliminate the gray market) or forsake the in-
vestment in these services. See id.
138. See Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 55 (1977). New manufacturers and existing
manufacturers entering new markets may need to employ vertical restrictions in or-
der to "induce competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of
capital and labor that is often required in the distribution of products unknown to the
consumer." Id. Thus, if unable to restrict gray market imports, new entrants into the
U.S. market may be discouraged from investing labor and capital to engender U.S.
goodwill.
139. Id. at 54-55 (recognizing that intrabrand competition diminished by verti-
cal restraints must be balanced against interbrand competition increased by vertical
restraints); see Staaf, The Law and Economics of the International Gray Market: Quality As-
surance, Free-Riding and Passing Off, 4 INTELL. PROP. J. 191, 196 (1989) (discussing verti-
cal restraints in gray market context).
140. See C.I.T. Conference, supra note 72, at 543-44. Monopolistic price discrimi-
nation occurs when a manufacturer maximizes profits by charging different prices for
goods in different markets. Id. at 543. For example, a manufacturer has a product
that costs five dollars to produce. Three consumers desire the product. One of the
consumers is willing to pay ten dollars, the second consumer is willing to pay twenty
dollars, and the third consumer is willing to pay thirty dollars. If the manufacturer is
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effectively engage in price discrimination, however, the inter-
national enterprise would have to possess strong market power
in the product.1 4 ' A trademark does not grant a monopoly in
the production of the trademarked product, only a monopoly
in a name or symbol.142 Consequently, although a trademark
grants its owner power to control a name or symbol, a trade-
mark does not grant its owner sufficient market power 43 to
price discriminate in the overall market for its product.
44
C. Proposed Solution to the Problem of Non-Genuine
Gray Market Imports
The Customs Service should revise the affiliate exception
to protect holders of U.S. trademarks from foreign imports
bearing those same marks. In its present state, the affiliate ex-
ception allows the importation of non-genuine gray market
goods that deceive consumers and damage the goodwill of the
U.S. trademark owner The Customs Service should amend
the affiliate exception to exclude non-genuine gray market
goods imported without the consent of the trademark owner.
A revised affiliate exception barring non-genuine gray
market goods would be beneficial for several reasons. Initially,
the Customs Service could help maintain low prices for the
consumer by fostering interbrand competition. An amended
affiliate exception will also protect the U.S. consumer from de-
ceit and the U.S. trademark from damage to its goodwill.
Furthermore, a revised affiliate exception would not create
additional administrative burdens on the Customs Service.
allowed to engage in price discrimination, then it will sell one product to each con-
sumer at the price each is willing to pay. In this example, the manufacturer makes
forty-five dollars profit. Id.
If a manufacturer is not allowed to price discriminate, it will have to set one price
for all consumers. In this example the manufacturer will sell at twenty dollars. Id. at
544. In this way, the manufacturer has the benefit of two sales (one to the twenty
dollar consumer and one to the thirty dollar consumer) for a total profit of thirty
dollars. Id.
141. See Hansen, supra note 37, at 260 n.46.
142. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918) ("In
truth, a trade-mark confers no monopoly whatever in a proper sense .... ").
143. See Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th
Cir. 1982) (defining market power as the "power to raise prices significantly above
the competitive level without losing all of one's business").
144. See Hansen, supra note 37, at 259-60 (The "U.S. trademark owner who dis-
tributes the product could price-gouge only if it had very substantial market share.").
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The Customs Service would only have to make determinations
as to the physical composition of the goods or their place of
manufacture; it would not be required to make difficult deter-
minations as to the likelihood of confusion between the marks
(the standard test for trademark infringement), or equally ar-
duous determinations of whether the U.S. trademark owner
has established sufficient protectable goodwill.
A revised affiliate exception that examined the place
where the imports were manufactured would effectively pre-
vent non-genuine gray market imports. Even if foreign manu-
facturers use the same process or materials when producing
goods, differing production standards or lack of English lan-
guage instructions transform the foreign-made goods into
non-genuine goods. Thus, the U.S. trademark owner could
prevent the importation of non-genuine gray market goods by
submitting a list of legitimate places of manufacture to the
Customs Service. If the goods were not manufactured in one
of these certified places, the goods would not be admitted.
CONCLUSION
The Customs Service's affiliate exception to the general
bar on gray market goods should be revised. The importation
of non-genuine gray market goods through the affiliate excep-
tion contravenes both the plain language and the intent of the
statute that the regulations were promulgated to enforce.
Modifying the affiliate exception would enable the Customs
Service to prevent international price discrimination and main-
tain low consumer prices, while protecting the U.S. trademark
owner from loss of goodwill and the U.S. consumer from de-
ception.
David A. Piedra*
J.D. Candidate, 1991, Fordham University.
